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On the dynamic relationship between stakeholder interaction and CSR outcomes: 




Purpose – This paper critically explores the interactions of key stakeholders and their impact 
upon CSR practices in the Zambian copper mining sector.  
Design/methodology/approach – This case study of the Zambian copper mining sector 
utilises an overall political economy framework, focusing on power asymmetries between the 
state and MNCs. Within this context, we draw on both stakeholder salience theory and 
legitimacy theory in order to explore the interactions of key stakeholders and their impact 
upon CSR practices. 
Findings – We find power asymmetries between the state and MNCs existing according to a 
number of different dimensions which are exacerbated by a number of factors including 
divisions within the government itself as a key stakeholder. However, despite the existence of 
stark power asymmetries, we find that in the Zambian context, there are some possibilities for 
agency on the part of civil society, and so that legitimacy theory has some (albeit limited) 
explanatory potential. 
Originality/value - The paper contributes to the literature on CSR in developing countries by 
exploring these issues in a critical case, that of the Zambian copper mining sector on which 
the economy is so heavily dependent. 
Key words - Corporate social responsibility; mining sector; civil society; the state; 
developing countries; Zambia. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we explore the complex relationships between key stakeholders that shape 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) practices in a developing country context. Whilst 
there is a limited number of recent studies focusing on CSR-related issues in developing 
countries generally (Belal et al., 2015; Belal and Owen, 2007; Lauwo et al., 2016), there is in 
particular a paucity of such research on Africa (Rahaman, 2010). Furthermore, much CSR 
research is not attuned to the particularities and realities of the developing countries setting 
and so fails to be relevant to local stakeholders and contexts (Blowfield and Frynas, 2005; 
Fox, 2004), and to capture the socio-economic and political challenges in these countries. 
CSR remains a politically contested area of power relationship imbalances such that there are 
important gaps between companies’ CSR discourse and practices (Frynas, 2005). In 
developing countries, the environment is less enabling so that the state, as an actor, has an 
important role to play potentially in motivating and/or enforcing CSR (Hamann, 2006; 
Idemudia, 2008).  
 
Against this background, we explore the above issues using the Zambian copper mining 
industry as a critical case, given the country’s almost total dependence on the sector 
contributing up to 70% of foreign exchange income and over 10% of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) in 2014 (IMF, 2015)[1]. Such a high degree of dependence is suggestive of the stark 
power asymmetries likely to exist between Zambia, as a developing country, and the foreign-
owned Multinational Corporations (MNCs), with their consequent effect upon CSR practices. 
Given such power asymmetries, Lauwo et al., (2016) argue that legitimacy theory approaches 
commonly used in CSR research, are inappropriate to developing countries contexts. 
 
Indeed, despite CSR initiatives by MNCs, the companies’ operations in Zambia continue to 
have a detrimental social, economic and environmental impact on the country, including tax 
evasion (Christian Aid, 2015; Counter Balance, 2010), environmental degradation, negative 
impact on human health, labour and human rights abuses (Das and Rose, 2014; Human 
Rights Watch, 2011; Lindahl, 2014). Our contribution lies in our focus on the dynamic 
interaction processes between different key stakeholders in this particular context and on how 
this interaction impacts on CSR practices (Idemudia, 2011). In so doing, we give voice to 
both managerial and non-managerial stakeholders in the MNCs, as well as in the government 
and its regulatory agencies, local municipal councils, and civil society. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. The first section discusses the theoretical approach 
adopted in our study, providing key background to understanding the role of CSR 
stakeholders in developing countries and of the mining sector in particular. Then, we describe 
our research approach, the particular socio-political economic background to Zambia and the 
CSR developments in the mining sector so as to set the context for our empirical analysis. We 
subsequently present and discuss our findings, concluding that despite stark power 
asymmetries present in the relationship between the state and MNCs, some agency, albeit 
limited, is possible, as civil society in particular co-opts previously dormant stakeholders so 
as to increase both its own salience, but more importantly that of the state. 
 
2.  CSR processes and stakeholder interactions 
 
2.1.  Theoretical approach 
The CSR literature (Parker, 2005, p. 844) is “voluminous, disparate, eclectic, and still without 
commonly agreed philosophies or standpoints” so that one of the challenges in CSR research 
results from this lack of any agreed theoretical perspective to drive systematic research (Gray 
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et al., 1995). Stakeholder theory (Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 1984) and legitimacy theory 
(Lindblom, 1994; Suchman, 1995) have been dominant theories within CSR research that is 
concerned with explaining the interaction between organisations and their environment.  
 
According to legitimacy theory, organisations exist in society under an expressed or implied 
social contract and continually seek to establish congruence between the value system of the 
organisation and the value system of society. Legitimacy theory has been used to explain the 
motivation behind CSR disclosures (Deegan, 2002), where corporate disclosures and 
practices are used as instruments of external accountability to influence (or even manipulate) 
stakeholder perceptions (Milne and Patten, 2002)[2]. While legitimacy theorists focus on the 
importance of compliance with the expectations of society, stakeholder theory regards CSR 
as part of the dialogue between the organisation and its stakeholders. By placing the 
organisation at the centre of analysis, a stakeholder is broadly defined as “any group or 
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firms’ objectives” 
(Freeman 1984, p. 25). The theory posits that the organisations’ continued existence requires 
the support of various powerful stakeholders with conflicting demands and that stakeholder 
approval must be sought and, if necessary, the organisation’s activities adjusted to gain that 
approval (Roberts, 1992). Given this reasoning, organisations must identify the key 
stakeholders influencing the CSR agenda, as CSR should be directed towards meeting their 
needs (Baur and Palazzo, 2011; Gray and Guthrie, 2007).  
 
However, as Gray et al., (1995) argue, legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory are in fact 
overlapping, rather than competing theories, while the concept of legitimacy itself is relevant 
to various theoretical approaches such as stakeholder theory, institutional theory and resource 
dependence theory (Chen and Roberts, 2010; Deegan, 2002). From this perspective, mining 
companies need to identify the demands of various stakeholders so as to ensure long-term 
success (Mäkelä and Näsi, 2010), whereas failure to acknowledge and address their concerns 
could stigmatise companies as operating in an irresponsible manner (Gordon et al., 2012), so 
jeopardising their perceived legitimacy. Visser (2008), for example, notes that corporations in 
developing countries engage in the provision of social services that would be seen as 
government’s responsibility in developed countries. Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) 
activism in developing countries may also create legitimacy gaps, so providing significant 
motivation for companies to engage, or else attempt to engage, in responsible business 
practices in order to acquire or else maintain legitimacy (Doh and Teegan, 2002; Lauwo et 
al., 2016). Alternatively, organisations may use legitimation techniques, such as linking 
themselves to other institutions, in order to develop moral and cognitive legitimacy. Siddiqui 
and Uddin (2016) give the example of the Bangladeshi state which depends on businesses, 
not only for economic reasons, such as investment and employment, but also because of 
businessmen’s influence over state politics in the particular context of Bangladesh.  
 
Whilst we draw on both stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory in our analysis, we argue 
that by themselves, these theoretical approaches are insufficient to capture the complexity of 
stakeholder interaction with regard to CSR practices in developing countries. In this regard, 
legitimacy theories as applied to developing countries are questionable as despite the 
increasing social and environmental impact of corporate activities, companies continue to 
carry out these activities unchallenged (see Banerjee, 2008). Indeed, Lauwo et al., (2016, p. 
1043) argue that the extent to which stakeholder and legitimacy theories “can explain the 
contradictions and dilemmas faced by developing countries with respect to CSR practices has 
remained problematic [as] they pay little attention to the broader socio-political, economic, 
historical and power structures that shape CSR reporting practices”. 
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Therefore, we depart from stakeholder theory, which is strictly organisation-centred (Gray et 
al., 1995) and defines issues of legitimacy and responsibility based on narrow business 
interests (Banerjee, 2008). Instead, our analysis is based on a critical interpretation of 
reported stakeholder views in order to explore the complex relationships among stakeholders 
in the CSR arena. In order not to underplay the role of other processes outside the immediate 
realm of the MNCs, MNCs are not placed at the centre of analysis, but are regarded as part of 
a complex web of interactions (see Figure 3 in section 4.1). Moreover, the stakeholder groups 
are not internally homogenous, as there may be conflicts within the groups, while their 
interaction is rather complex (Hamann et al., 2005). Relationships among stakeholders are 
reciprocal and dependent on contingent factors and path dependent, in that future interactions 
are constrained and informed by previous developments and actions. Such a multi-
stakeholder interaction approach resonates with the approach of the (environmental) 
management plans of mining companies operating in Zambia which emphasise a 
proportionate partnership approach to defining a development strategy for the Copperbelt 
communities (ibid., 2005).  
 
Moreover, the processes that inform CSR initiatives and the interaction of stakeholders who 
are seeking to leverage their interests are bounded by the local socio-political and economic 
context. The lack of human and institutional capacity to address stakeholders’ concerns and 
promote CSR in developing countries has been highlighted by the literature (Fox, 2004; 
Idemudia, 2011). However, the structural determinants and constraints which enable or 
constrain CSR initiatives and development in African countries are largely undetermined 
(Idemudia, 2014). Similarly, stakeholder theory approaches to CSR pay insufficient attention 
to the role of power and to stakeholder interactions within a framework of political 
economy[3]. The widely used stakeholder salience framework (Mitchell et al., 1997) 
identifies and assesses the salience of various stakeholders for companies based on the 
combination of three stakeholders’ attributes, i.e. power[4], urgency, and legitimacy. Within 
this framework, previously dormant stakeholders may have little or no interaction with a firm 
but management should remain cognisant of them because the dynamic nature of 
relationships means that dormant stakeholders will become more salient to management if 
they acquire either urgency or legitimacy. Other studies, offer different views as to the 
importance of urgency and legitimacy as a stakeholder attribute (Neville et al., 2011), and 
argue that salience may be assessed in terms of stakeholder coalitions around issues and 
organisational fields (Neville and Menguc, 2006). Additionally, Neville et al., (2011) raise 
further criticisms of Mitchell et al., (1997), in arguing that power, moral legitimacy and 
urgency should be located on a spectrum, rather than being treated as dichotomous variables 
and they argue, echoing Mitchell et al., (1997) that stakeholder salience itself may be highly 
complex in nature.  
 
Importantly, however, from the perspective of CSR in a developing country context, power 
dynamics among CSR stakeholders cannot be studied without considerations of the local 
institutional dimensions shaped by the country’s colonial past and the current neoliberal 
mandate of development affecting CSR practices. Interactions among stakeholders are seen 
as being shaped by legal and economic conditions that are oriented towards meeting foreign 
expectations reproducing a CSR model in which MNCs are seen as the main drivers of 
economic progress and social welfare (Adanhounme, 2011). 
 
In the current study, stakeholders are seen to be embedded in a complex nexus of 
relationships which are not only defined by the desire to gain legitimation (Mitchell et al., 
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1997; Patten, 1992), but are also permeated by power asymmetries (both between the MNCs 
and other stakeholders and among the different stakeholders) (Banerjee, 2008; Covey and 
Brown, 2001; Puxty, 1991; Rajak, 2006). An understanding of the dynamics of power and in 
particular, of power asymmetries inherent within a particular institutional context, is key in 
order to gain insights into the legitimating actions of key stakeholders, and of the relevant 
interactions between these actors with regard to CSR practices.  
 
In the context of power asymmetries, these are usually discussed with regard to the 
relationship between governments and MNCs operating in developing countries. These 
power asymmetries, for example, manifest themselves at the very outset in terms of the 
negotiation of mineral development agreements between the host state and MNCs, so leading 
to a governance gap (Hilson, 2012), such that the state can see its capacity to enforce 
regulations promoting corporate accountability as being significantly compromised (Lauwo 
et al., 2016). Similarly, Siddiqui and Uddin (2016) acknowledge the state’s inability and/or 
unwillingness to stop human rights abuses, especially those committed by MNCs. They cite 
clear evidence of what they term the “state-business nexus” in perpetuating human rights 
disasters, with “this nature of the state creat[ing] the necessary conditions for businesses to 
disregard human rights in businesses” (Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016, p. 696). Moreover, given 
the existence of weak institutions, high rates of corruption and the inability of governments to 
implement regulations (Visser, 2006), there have been increased calls for “surrogate 
accountability” in developing countries (Sinkovics et al., 2016). Such surrogates, which can 
take a variety of forms (governments, supra-national bodies, partnerships among corporations 
or civil society) may be better equipped to pressurise power wielders to do what is “right” 
(Rubenstein, 2007). However, with respect to Zambia specifically, Hamann and Kapelus 
(2004, p. 90) argue that, “in the case of the Copperbelt, the danger is that it is too remote for 
consistent surveillance from independent and critical organizations”. 
 
In the next section, we discuss the role of the various stakeholders in developing countries 
and, in particular, CSR in the extractive industries. 
 
2.2. Role of stakeholders in developing countries  
Whilst CSR is generally seen as being influenced by societal expectations (Carroll and 
Buchholz, 2014), the picture that emerges for developing countries is more complex. In the 
context of developing countries, CSR debates focus on the complex relationship between 
CSR and development and the impact that CSR initiatives have on developing countries’ 
socio-economic development (Reed and Reed, 2004). CSR initiatives vary across different 
countries as these are shaped by the local social, political, economic and institutional contexts 
(Alfonso et al., 2010). The lack of understanding of the complex relationship among CSR 
practices, local actors and contexts, and development results in a recurring tension between 
common CSR expectations and local challenges and opportunities (Hamann, 2006). 
 
Although the CSR agenda in developing countries is determined mainly by the interaction 
between MNCs, civil society and the state (Fung, 2003; Vogel, 2008), a conflict be ween the 
power of corporations and that of the state has been observed (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007; 
Sikka, 2010), with the latter affording autonomy to MNCs, resulting in the transfer of 
political power to many of these entities (Lehman, 1999). Thus, much of the decision-making 
of MNCs, including that related to their social and environmental responsibilities, has been 
left free from any control or influence by governments (Bailey et al., 1998) due to the 
significant economic benefits they bring to developing countries. Such dependence is often 
exacerbated by fears that MNCs may relocate if enacted regulations are perceived to 
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encroach on companies’ decision-making (O’Dwyer et al., 2005). Such a level of autonomy, 
then, enables MNCs to prioritise global, as opposed to local expectations. From this 
perspective, an MNC may claim to be operating responsibly, whilst local stakeholders believe 
otherwise (Lawrence, 2007), resulting in differing stakeholder interpretations of companies’ 
responsibilities and potential conflict (Gordon et al., 2012).  
 
It is against this background that the role of civil society has increased in promoting CSR 
practices in developing countries, as the majority of governments fail to provide the 
infrastructure and environment enabling the promotion of CSR (Utting, 2002; Welford, 
2004). Corporate behaviour has been exposed to public scrutiny as a result of civil society 
activism (Dahan et al., 2010). Another critical role played by civil society lies in the 
representation of the less powerful voices in society (Banerjee, 2001). As Blowfield and 
Frynas (2005) note, the voices of the less privileged, the less powerful, have largely been 
ignored, so that civil society is seen as a “voice” or representative of those who are 
individually voiceless.  
 
Despite the arguments above, there has been a growing recognition also of the new 
opportunities arising for the state to deploy CSR for governance purposes and to regulate 
corporate behaviours through CSR (Gond et al., 2011; Moon, 2002). However, Visser and 
Tolhurst (2010) note that African governments are yet to evolve national policies that could 
help promote CSR in the region, while Idemudia (2011) identifies the lack of a clear and 
consistent governmental CSR policy framework, in Nigeria, as a constraint to the effective 
development of CSR. Other key stakeholders in this context include supranational financial 
institutions, like the World Bank, which can exert significant pressure and so act as a major 
influence on companies’ CSR activities (Rahaman et al., 2004). 
 
In this connection, extractive industries and the mining sector in Africa face also great 
pressures to embrace CSR due to their large-scale effect on the environment and local 
population. However, mining companies have failed to address the origins that give rise to 
economic development and environmental problems by adopting CSR approaches that 
reproduce the shortfalls of past incomplete agendas imposed by external actors (Campbell, 
2012). Hamann and Kapelus (2004) examined the CSR practices of mining companies in 
both South Africa and Zambia and found that there are still important gaps between mining 
companies’ CSR activities and accountability. Importantly, they argue that in Zambia CSR 
practices have little influence on fundamental business decisions based on profitability, which 
often have the most significant social impact. Instead, CSR activities played primarily an 
“ameliorative role in the context of significant social disruptions and uncertainty in the wake 
of privatisation” (Hamann and Kapelus, 2004, p. 90). Similarly, Lungu and Mulenga (2005) 
in a commissioned report on the CSR practices in the Copperbelt region found significant 
changes in CSR approaches, with deterioration after the privatisation of the state-owned 
Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM). Whilst these are important studies on the 
Zambian Copperbelt, they are more limited in scope and importantly, do not focus 
specifically on the interaction between key Zambian stakeholders in terms of de ermining 
CSR practices, the key research question of the current study. 
 
Prior studies on the mining sector in Zambia have not addressed stakeholder interactions and 
power asymmetries, and their impact on CSR practices. Instead, prior studies have focused on 
privatisation and mining development agreements (Fraser and Lungu, 2007; Lungu, 2008a), 
provision of welfare/social services (Lungu, 2008b), Chinese investment and corporate 
governance (Haglund, 2009; Negi, 2008), local communities and mining investment (Negi, 





























































Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal7  
2010; Van Alstine and Afionis, 2013), environmental impact of mining on farming land 
(Kříbek and Nyambe, 2005) and the social experiences of former miners (Mususa, 2010). 
Studies that are directed at CSR in the sector are few and their focus is also limited. For 
instance, Noyoo (2010) examined the link between CSR and government policies in Zambia 
while Lungu and Shikwe (2006) focussed on small scale (mostly gemstone) mining. Further, 
a study by Van Alstine and Afionis (2013) on a local community and mining companies’ 
CSR practices revealed weak community capacity to hold the mining company and local 
government to account. Thus, in this study we provide a unique insight, as it is the first of its 
kind in focusing on key stakeholder interactions and power asymmetries in the context of the 
Zambian copper mining industry. 
 
3. Research approach 
In this study, we address a variety of stakeholders with diverse interests and expectations 
regarding the copper mining corporate activity in Zambia. In Zambia, as in other African 
countries, the development strategy of the mining sector is supposed to be based on the 
proportionate partnership of various stakeholders promoting a multi-stakeholder dialogue 
(Hamann et al., 2005). We were interested in investigating the actual processes that inform 
CSR practices in the particular local context through the dynamic interaction of multiple 
stakeholders. Therefore, we focused on the interactions among the main stakeholder groups 
identified by the literature as important actors in the CSR agenda in developing countries 
(broadly categorised as mining companies, the state and civil society). However, we also 
included representatives from other important local and international stakeholder groups such 
as, higher education institutions or academia (Gray and Guthrie, 2007), national accountancy 
bodies (Tilt, 2009), the local community (Banerjee, 2007), stakeholder engagement initiatives 
(Andriof and Waddock, 2002) and supranational or international financial institutions 
(Rahaman et al., 2004). 
 
We draw upon rich material from 43 semi-structured interviews (see Appendix 1 for the 
detailed list of interviewees)[5] with individuals representing the three main stakeholder 
groups, together with other stakeholders. Key representatives from 39 different institutions, 
who occupied senior management positions or had onsiderable leadership roles, were 
targeted and identified using a snow-balling technique (Titscher et al., 2000). Further, in 
order to gain access to some stakeholders, formal authorisation/introduction had to be 
obtained[6]. The data-gathering protocol involved the use of face to face interviews, which 
were recorded on a digital audio recorder with the permission of the respondents. The 
interviews lasted between 45 to 90 minutes while written notes were also taken during the 
interviews. The 43 interviews were conducted by one of the co-au hors during his three-
month fieldwork in Zambia between October and December 2011. Interview questions were 
based on the interview protocol and stakeholders were encouraged to elaborate freely. In 
order to elicit rich interpretations, interviewees were questioned about CSR in an unprompted 
manner in order to capture their understanding of the CSR processes, its components and 
significance (Maignan, 2001).  
 
The recorded interviews were subsequently transcribed in their entirety. The transcripts, 
together with any relevant notes taken during the interviews, were then analysed thematically. 
Analysis of the transcribed data was directed at the search for underlying themes and sub-
themes in addressing our research objective whilst remaining sufficiently flexible so as to 
profit from “opportunistic” dimensions that may arise in the research (Buchanan et al., 1988). 
The quotations used present the “thick description” (Denzin, 1994, p. 505) as they appear to 
represent a particular theme. However, in analysing the interviews, we are relying on the 
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interviewees’ self-descriptions regarding what we identify as power (or power asymmetries) 
and the effects of their actions and resultant interactions. This is potentially inherently 
problematic for us so that we recognise this as a possible limitation of this type of research. 
Each interview was numbered and the quotations in the analysis below are in the format of 
“interview number, page from relevant text”.  
 
In our analysis of the relevant power asymmetries, we utilised an overall political economy 
framework and drew on both concepts of legitimation from legitimacy theories and 
stakeholder salience theory (Mitchell et al., 1997; Neville et al., 2011), whilst acknowledging 
limitations in both sets of theoretical approach. The next section sets the socio-political and 
economic context for this analysis. 
 
4.  The Zambian socio-political and economic context and CSR developments 
The copper mining industry in Zambia has been a major contributor to national development 
ever since the discovery of one of the world’s largest deposits of copper and cobalt ores in the 
Copperbelt province. After independence in 1964, the industry was nationalised and put 
under the management of the national parastatal company, Zambia Consolidated Copper 
Mines (ZCCM). In addition to contributing to government revenue, ZCCM also provided 
local communities with infrastructure, water, medical care, education and other facilities 
(Hamann and Kapelus, 2004). Zambia’s reliance on the sector was such that at its peak, it 
accounted for more than 80% of the country’s foreign exchange earnings, over 50% of 
government revenue and at least 20% of total formal sector employment (CSO, 2004). As can 
be seen from Table 1, the country continues to be highly dependent on the sector. 
 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
Following the oil crises and falling copper prices in the 1970s to 1990s, the economy 
collapsed such that per capita income declined by 50% during this period, leaving the country 
the 25
th
 poorest in the world (Ferguson, 1999, p. 6). This exposed the susceptibility of the 
country’s economy to external factors affecting the copper prices[7], so highlighting the 
fragility of the Zambian economy given its reliance on this commodity. 
 
International donor support was sought and provided but made subject to certain conditions 
by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). These Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs), including privatisation, formed a significant part of the liberalisation 
solutions seen as a panacea for African postcolonial economies (Adanhounme, 2011). 
 
The privatisation of ZCCM, under World Bank’s guidance, during the period 1997-2000, 
resulted in the formation of seven companies which were eventually bought by seven MNCs. 
Entry of the MNCs into the sector marked an important change in its management, given its 
strategic role in national development.  
 
With privatisation, there is now no restriction on ownership changes which exposes the sector 
to systemic pressures for “short-term” profit maximisation (Sikka, 2010). Given fluctuation 
in world copper prices, investors may decide whether to exit Zambia, only to be replaced by 
new entrants, so potentially impacting CSR practices. In the former ZCCM companies, the 
government continues to hold between 10% to 20% ownership through the state owned 
ZCCM Investments Holdings (ZCCM-IH), which minimally entitles the government to 
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mining companies’ dividends.  However, all available evidence suggests that this 
shareholding gives the government little influence over the companies. Overall, the industry 
landscape has changed dramatically, as it is now both MNCs and State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) that are the key players. Appendix 2 gives details of the major copper mining 
companies operating in Zambia showing both their ownership and percentage of copper 
production.  
Overall, mining activity has increased as new large-scale mining operations have started up 
alongside the former ZCCM companies. The entry of MNCs (SOEs) has witnessed increased 
investment in the sector with cumulative new investment since 2000 approximating USD 10 
billion by 2013 (USD 4 billion by 2008) (ICMM, 2014) [8]. This has resulted in increased 
copper production when compared to the significant drop in the 1990s (see Figure 1). 
Importantly, this increase in copper investment has raised stakeholder expectations as to the 
MNCs’ sectoral contribution to the country. 
 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 
As the diversity in ownership and mining activities has increased, the government has been 
faced with the challenge of how to effectively manage the growing sector. Thus, there was 
need to streamline the government ministries and regulatory agencies in line with the sectoral 
changes[9]. The regulation of the mining sector is depicted in Figure 2 below. The capacity 
of these government ministries and regulatory agencies is an important factor when 
considering the regulatory powers of the government. According to the Worldwide 
Governance Indicator (WGI), the regulatory quality of Zambia is still relatively low[10], with 
important implications for the regulation of the sector. 
 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
 
4.1  Stakeholder interaction and demands for change 
Whilst there have been notable benefits resulting from the increased MNCs investment, there 
have also been adverse outcomes which have raised concerns about the social and 
environmental responsibilities of the mining companies and the inability of government (or 
other stakeholders) to hold them accountable. It has been observed that the overall quality of 
employment and the proportionate contribution to total formal employment of the sector 
remains low (ICMM, 2014), despite the recorded increases in employment levels due to 
increased casualisation. Further, relative to the increased copper production, the proportion of 
the industry’s contribution to government revenue has remained low (ZRA, 2013), whilst 
there have been reported tax evasion schemes on the part of some mining companies 
(Christian Aid, 2011). 
 
Concerns have been raised also regarding the ability of government to regulate the sector and 
whether the mining companies are responsible enough to prevent or at least minimise the 
adverse impacts of their operations (Lungu, 2008a). Within the mining townships, there has 
been a major deterioration of social infrastructure such as housing, health, water and 
sanitation. Social infrastructure had been previously under the responsibility of the ZCCM, 
but is now being undertaken by the municipal councils, whose financial capacity is greatly 
constrained (Lungu and Mulenga, 2005). The limited benefits, despite the increased mining 
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investment and copper revenue, have been attributed mostly to the lopsided development 
agreements that these MNCs entered into with the Zambian government (Christian Aid, 
2011).  
 
Concerns over these detrimental effects of mining have given rise to some civil society 
activism. With respect to development agreements, for instance, the contentious issues 
relating to taxation and stabilisation clauses, which have negative implications for 
government revenues, bolstered a public outcry that MNCs were “milking the country” of 
revenue (Biau, 2010, p. 23). It is also against the background of such public outcry that the 
then opposition political party, the Patriotic Front, gained support on the promise of increased 
development as mining companies would be made accountable (Lungu, 2008b). The presence 
and activism of civil society is expected to grow in view of the “stable” political 
environment[11] and the external pressure from donors (including the World Bank and IMF) 
for governance reforms. However, the growing diversity of investors also implies that CSR 
prioritisation is not uniform across the sector (Marquis et al., 2007), while local communities’ 
developmental needs are found to be largely ignored in companies’ CSR strategies (Van 
Alstine and Afionis, 2013). Some CSR related activities, such as the resurfacing of roads, are 
seen as largely reflecting legitimation responses of the mining companies to stakeholder 
pressures (Egels and Kallifatides, 2006)[12] rather than as initiatives that can address more 
fundamental local issues.  
 
Against this background and as part of the requirements for financial assistance obtained 
from the World Bank in 2007, the Zambian mining sector perceived the need to manage 
stakeholder pressure after the privatisation of the mines, and created the Zambia Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative (ZEITI) in 2009, which became Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) compliant in 2012. The ZEITI is a forum which brings 
together the three key stakeholders groups (mining companies, the government and civil 
society) and produces reconciliation reports on what mining companies pay to the 
government and what government receives as revenue from mining companies. The ZEITI 
aims at addressing tensions arising from the perceived lack of transparency in the 
negotiations of the mining agreements, lack of access to information on mining companies’ 
contributions to the government, and the absence of sustained multi-stakeholder dialogue 
(ZEITI, 2017).  
 
In summary, while there are undoubtedly instances of good practice with regard to CSR 
projects undertaken by the mining companies, what is most apparent from both the literature 
and our review of the Zambian context in this section, concerns the nature of the power 
asymmetries present in the relationship between the state and the MNCs. Figure 3 attempts to 
capture the complex channels of interactions among the stakeholder groups in the mining 
sector in Zambia and guide the analysis of our empirical evidence. 
 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
 
5.  Empirical analysis 
 
Power asymmetries: the empirical evidence 
The different forms of power asymmetry arise largely from the institutional constraints 
outlined in Section 4 above. However, in attempting a dynamic analysis of the interactions 
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and so of the changing power of the various key stakeholders in the Zambian context, we 
remain conscious that power is transitory by its very nature, such that it can be acquired or 
lost. Such a perspective we argue is crucial given our political economy study of the interplay 
of power and the goals of power wielders (Zald, 1970). 
 
From Section 4 above, the various MNCs operating in Zambia emerge as the power wielders 
or as dominant stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997) in their relationship with the state, given 
the importance of copper mining to the economy (Lauwo et al., 2016; Visser, 2008). In 
attempting a finer grained analysis of the Zambian case, the following dimensions of power 
asymmetry are apparent: 
A. Dimensions of power asymmetry in the Zambian copper mining industry 
 
At the national level: 
a) Strength of the MNCs versus the state (and the local community) and 
b) Strength of the MNCs versus a vital state institution: the Zambia Revenue Authority 
(ZRA). 
 
Reinforcing and heightening these power asymmetries are capacity constraints: 
c) Capacity constraints: civil society versus MNCs and the state (the state-business 
nexus) and 
d) Capacity constraints: the state versus the MNCs. 
 
Finally, exacerbating the impact of such power asymmetries in terms of their effect 
upon CSR practices are divisions within key stakeholder groups:  
e) Divisions within stakeholder groups: within the state and 
f) Divisions within stakeholder groups: within MNCs as a group-their views of CSR. 
  
Turning to each dimension in turn, we find the following: 
 
At the national level: 
 
a) Strength of the MNCs versus the state (and the local community) 
Starting with the most obvious power asymmetry, two different civil society interviewees 
view the MNCs operating in Zambia as being economically powerful, with both the 
government and the local population dependent upon them in terms of local governance and 
social welfare. These interviewees raise concerns about the economic dependence of the 
government on mining companies and the government’s position in trying not to “scare 
away” the MNCs, so lessening any potential power of civil society organisations. The 
government is thought to treat the MNCs “like gods”, adopting a soft stance towards them 
and signing favourable agreements for the MNCs. 
 
You see, if I have the money then I call the shots…the people who have the money are the 
multinationals […], and so they [MNCs] will begin to tell you this can go out now given a 
situation where the multinational companies said don’t include this clause, I expect that the 
government is going then to say even if it is good for Zambia, the government is going to listen 
to them [MNCs] and say yah that will not include it [C3, p. 9-10]. 
 
If we decompose a key stakeholder, the state, into one of its important constituents or 
ministries, this perspective is illustrated further. 
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b)  Strength of the MNCs versus a vital state institution: the Zambia Revenue 
Authority (ZRA) 
As to be expected, the ZRA acts as a vital conduit in the relationship between the MNCs and 
the state given that it acts as tax collector. This of course is important given the dominant 
percentage of Zambian tax revenue arising from the mining sector. However, one civil 
society interviewee alleges: 
 
Sometimes the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) officers when they go to audit the mining 
books, they have been sent away to say we are not ready, you can come back after six months. 
But that’s illegal by law and they tell you this is not your system, this should be the one, when 
you should go and say this is what it is. My system says this and you should do it. Pay me this 
much but your books say you haven’t paid this much [C5, p. 16]. 
 
In both cases above, regarding MNCs power versus that of the state generally, and then 
versus the ZRA, interviewees are unequivocal in viewing the corporates as occupying the 
position of unambiguous power wielders or as dominant stakeholders in Mitchell et al.,’s 
(1997) terms. Given the particular weakness in the state’s ability to collect taxes due, this has 
knock-on effects in the proper functioning of other state institutions. Moreover, MNCs power 
is further augmented by a range of different capacity constraints on the part of other key 
stakeholders. 
 
Reinforcing and heightening these power asymmetries are capacity constraints: 
 
c)  Capacity constraints: civil society versus MNCs and the state (the state-business 
nexus) 
One interviewee representing the supranational financial institution gives an insightful view 
into the current role and efficiency of civil society. In the context of the ZEITI forum 
discussed in Section 4 above, this interviewee highlights the inability of civil society to break 
down important information and to make it relevant to the public in order to demand change. 
From this perspective, civil society is considered good at advocacy but poor at analysis. 
 
Given MNCs’ role as power wielders or as dominant stakeholders in the Zambian context of 
severe institutional constraints on the part of the state, civil society has the potential to act as 
surrogate account holders (Belal el al., 2015; Rubenstein, 2007) pressurising the powerful to 
act in an ethical manner (Sinkovics et al., 2016). However, other constraints in turn, relating 
to civil society’s power of analysis render this difficult. This same interviewee, W1, makes 
another important point: that civil society fails to engage with the community and seems to 
speak only to other civil society stakeholders. 
 
From this relatively independent perspective, interviewee W1 not being part of any of the 
three key stakeholders groups in Zambia (i.e. the state, companies or civil society), argues 
that Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) fail in their key role highlighted in Section 4, 
relating to their potential activist role in arousing interest in the local community in key 
issues and that they fail to ensure maximum community benefit from any legitimacy threats 
as perceived by the mining MNCs. These emerge as major weaknesses on the part of civil 
society. 
 
Additionally, interviewees frequently mention key capacity constraints on the part of the state 
versus the MNCs. 
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d) Capacity constraints: the state versus the MNCs 
These capacity constraints are summarised aptly by the interviewee W1, from the 
supranational financial institution: 
 
The private sector at any point in time when they want to hide monies or carry out these 
activities [transfer pricing of supplying material] is much cleverer than the government [W1, p. 
11]. 
 
The state, as a dependent stakeholder (Mitchell et al., 1997) perhaps, finds its weak position 
to be exacerbated not only by divisions within its own organisation, but also within that of 
another key stakeholder, civil society, with an adverse impact on CSR practices. 
 
Finally, exacerbating the impact of such power asymmetries in terms of their effect 
upon CSR practices are divisions within key stakeholder groups:  
 
e)  Divisions within stakeholder groups: within the state 
In the view of one government employee: 
 
It’s important that our politicians understand how institutions[13] run so that whatever political 
direction they give, it’s in line with the way the institutions run [G1, p. 14].   
 
Such lack of understanding by politicians as to the nature and proper running of the various 
government institutions, adversely impacts on its relationship with the MNCs due to the lack 
of a united front. 
 
Another interviewee from civil society rather than government, argues political will on the 
part of central government to be key in addressing the challenges facing the governmental 
agencies that monitor the mining sector [C10, p. 3]. Such perceived lack of political will and 
coherence in implementation by government is argued to be common in developing countries 
(e.g. see Lauwo et al., 2016). 
 
Further divisions are evident in MNCs with respect to CSR practices. 
 
f) Divisions within stakeholder groups: within MNCs as a group-their views of CSR 
These divisions within MNCs regarding their views on the subject lead to a further lack of 
coherence, here regarding CSR practices, given both the different nationalities of the 
corporates as well as the short-termist nature of much of the investment, so adversely 
impacting the effectiveness of CSR practices.  
 
Such divisions have deepened with the arrival in Zambia of an altogether new type of 
investor, the Chinese SOEs. With these companies, the whole concept of CSR itself is either 
lacking or else very different from that as perceived by the western mining companies 
previously dominating the sector (Frost and Ho, 2005). With the SOEs, collaboration with 
both civil society and the state is hindered by the firms’ alleged human rights abuses, so 
hindering constructive dialogue. A mining union official comments regarding SOEs 
differences in perspective on labour rights:  
 
Labour laws are something new for Asian colleagues and remuneration and conditions of 
service are worse in mining companies owned by China [C6, p. 4]. 
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B. Reinforcing the power asymmetry between the state and the MNCs, is the exclusion 
of civil society from this dyadic relationship:  
 
a) From the outset: the negotiations for privatisation of the mines  
b) Ongoing exclusion of civil society from the state-business nexus 
c) Geographical distance  
d) State-business nexus: reinforcing the vicious circles of secrecy 
 
a)  From the outset: the negotiations for privatisation of the mines  
Tracing the origins of the power imbalance among the key stakeholders, we see this 
demonstrated by the exclusion of civil society from important political reforms, the prime 
example being the privatisation of mines in which it had no input whatsoever. As the 
interviewee explains below, this meant that civil society was left in ignorance as to the 
relevant development agreements, so entailing a lack of transparency and accountability as to 
the relationship between the government and the mines. 
 
(The) civil society in Zambia has not been involved in the negotiation for the sale of (the) 
mines. …Civil society has not been privy to the provisions within those agreements and that 
has been a bone of conte tion [C3, p. 10-12]. 
 
This continuing exclusion of civil society from the state-business nexus is discussed next by 
two other interviewees from that stakeholder group. 
 
b) On-going exclusion of civil society from the state-business nexus 
The political power of the government depends on the MNCs and even the discourse before 
elections is argued to be based on the “fear” that mining companies will go away if people do 
not vote for one political party or the other. According to another civil society interviewee, 
before elections, the interests of the Zambian state will be equated with those of the mining 
MNCs, such that if the latter are not respected, the population as discretionary stakeholders 
(Mitchell et al., 1997) will suffer. Such political and economic dependence of the state on 
MNCs distorts the balance of power among the various stakeholders, putting civil society in a 
weaker negotiation position. To quote one civil society interviewee: 
 
I would say the moderating factor should be meeting the expectations for the good of all the 
stakeholders and the power play will always be there because usually the mining houses tend to 
be very powerful and endeared to the government, […] civil society is always on the weaker 
side [C9, p. 10-11]. 
 
Here, following Siddiqui and Uddin (2016), the state-business nexus manifests itself again, 
with the state perhaps being a dependent stakeholder (Mitchell et al., 1997), acting as 
advocate for the MNCs which, it claims, deliver development to discretionary stakeholders, 
the local communities. This complex relationship between the MNCs and the state is 
complicated further by one non-human factor, also commented upon by Hamann and Kapelus 
(2004): 
 
c) Geographical distance 
In the view of one civil society interviewee, this power asymmetry is exacerbated by 
geographical distance which helps perpetuate the situation of secrecy as to the activities of 
the MNCs with regard to CSR: 
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The whole system has been undermined by ….the secrecy that has eliminated all forms of 
transparency and accountability by stakeholders …Because what accrues to the central 
government is used maybe in Lusaka and you don’t see it reflecting on the Copperbelt where 
the primary activities are being undertaken [C9, p. 9-10]. 
 
The result of all these factors cited by the various interviewees, is to reinforce the vicious 
circles of secrecy, so maintaining the status quo of stark power asymmetries. 
 
d) State-business nexus: reinforcing the vicious circles of secrecy 
A number of civil society interviewees highlight both the lack of information communicated 
to and engagement with the community regarding dealings between the government and the 
mining companies. Importantly, there is a paucity of information available as to the taxes 
paid by the MNCs to both central and local government authorities, so undermining and 
indeed eliminating any possible collaboration with other stakeholders: 
 
Also the government does not want to fully disclose how much they are getting from the mines. 
The mine outfits then also are kind of forced into submission in silence, because they feel that, 
if they say something, it will be contrary to the spirit of engagement with the government and 
they feel that they are accountable to the government, who are the licensing authority [C9, p. 9-
10, emphasis added]. 
 
Here, some complexity emerges as to the relationship between the government and the 
mining companies in that the corporates appear to be forced into silence regarding how much 
they pay to the state in terms of taxes etc. Indeed, the companies feel accountable to the 
government as another key stakeholder because it acts in some sense as a power wielder, 
being the licensing authority. This situation results in a vicious cycle of interactions that leads 
to yet more secrecy and lack of engagement by both the corporates and the state with other 
stakeholders.  
 
However, despite all these mutually reinforcing dimensions of power asymmetry, 
interviewees from the different key stakeholder groups comment on some changing dynamics 
in these relationships over time and so of their effects upon CSR practices. 
 
C. The changing dynamics over time of the relationships between the key stakeholders 
 
a)  Interactions and dynamics among MNCs and civil society 
b)  Civil society as becoming increasingly powerful over time 
 
Attempts by civil society to change the rules of the game: 
 
c) Civil society co-opting donors so as to strengthen the state’s power 
d) Civil society co-opting MNCs shareholders 
e) But, a constraint: the transitory nature of shareholder pressures favouring CSR  
 
The state as becoming more powerful versus in the past: 
 
f) Via legislative monitoring and other power-based strategies 
g) Path dependency: government assuming the running of a particular mine 
h)  But: path dependency again-community expectations 
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a)  Interactions and dynamics among MNCs and civil society 
Not only is civil society seen to reside outside the state-business nexus, but MNCs’ 
interaction with CSOs is seen as complex, as the leadership of both stakeholder groups is not 
always seen as being either accountable or legitimate. MNCs interact with civil society, for 
example, by providing information as requested, but there is a sense of mistrust in the 
relationship between the two in terms of how this information is used.  
 
They [NGOs] came around here but they decided to pick what they wanted to pick.... Because 
they were elections coming so it depended on who they talked to....did they talk to the junior 
people who may not have the statistics at their fingertips?....Did they verify this information 
with us, of course they didn’t [M4, p. 5]. 
 
This questioning by the corporate interviewee as to the judgment of civil society activists in 
terms of both whom they choose to speak to and their understanding as to the appropriateness 
of the data chosen, echoes to some extent the comments of the supranational financial 
institution interviewee as to the lack of analytical skills of civil society activists.  
 
Whilst MNCs may mistrust civil society, such sentiments are mutual. For example, one civil 
society interviewee, using the “master-slave” analogy to describe what s/he perceives as this 
unequal relationship, indicates that currently the Zambian community, as represented by civil 
society, and the MNCs are not seen as equal partners who co-exist responsibly and profit 
jointly from the natural resources of the country. Instead, MNCs are seen as foreign visitors. 
  
So if it [CSR] is seen as charity, it is like a far-fetched relationship, where one is a master and 
one is a slave, one owns and then out of his own goodwill and volition he can give some 
crumbs to the slave. That is not it …the people in those communities own the land and 
therefore they own the natural resources that exist within that area and the mines are visitors 
who have come to undertake business activities there. …CSR should be seen as a form of 
responsible co-existence. It consolidates the partnership of the inhabitants of the land …this 
why we associate all the mining firms with the foreign direct investment, because they are 
foreigners who have come to invest directly in those areas, so they are visitors [C9, p. 6 
emphasis added]. 
 
From this civil society viewpoint, CSR should be viewed as a legitimising tool by MNCs, 
which as foreigners, invest in Zambia and profit from its resources that are actually owned by 
the local inhabitants. CSR is explicitly viewed as a means by companies seeking to maintain 
their social contract with the local community, from a legitimacy theory perspective.  
 
However, despite such a starting point grounded in inequality as in the “master-slave” 
analogy, a number of CSO interviewees view the dynamics inherent in the particular 
institutional context in Zambia as changing. 
 
b) Civil society as becoming increasingly powerful over time 
Importantly, this increased power results from improved access to key information contained 
in both development and investment agreements, so enabling civil society to assume the role 
of auditors or watchdogs on behalf of the community: 
 
Over time, civil society has mobilised and they have built a critical mass and they have become 
a force. They voice on things that they see and also through some of the whistle blower 
opportunities that have come up. They have had access to some of the information contained 
within the development agreements and the investment agreements with the mines. …The 
government was compromised because the mines, usually are powerful multinational 





























































Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal17  
corporations, so they have very shrewd negotiating teams and they usually engage highly 
skilled negotiation teams which capacity we don’t usually find in the public sector and as a 
result they come out with a raw deal [C3, p. 10-12]. 
 
Given this stark power asymmetry evident in the negotiating capacities of the public sector 
compared to the corporates, civil society has been active in seeking to change the rules of the 
game altogether. 
 
Attempts by civil society to change the rules of the game: 
 
c) Civil society co-opting donors so as to strengthen the state’s power 
This attempted intervention is described by the same civil society interviewee as follows: 
 
And that is something that civil society has been trying to champion with the co-operating 
partners, the donor community, that they can help the country in negotiating these deals or in 
building capacity within the government institutions be, it in negotiating as well as in 
administering and regulating the mining sector as a whole [C3, p. 10-12]. 
 
In seeking to build the public sector’s negotiating capacity, civil society is trying to co-opt the 
government as an ally as opposed to remaining on the outside of the state-business nexus as 
an adversary. Importantly, donors whilst not highly visible stakeholders in our analysis to 
date, might be regarded generally as being dormant stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997), who 
possess power to impose their will. Additionally, from this perspective, civil society aims to 
build capability with the government, in terms of administering and regulating the mining 
sector, with the objective of increasing corporate accountability and transparency. In so 
doing, civil society is arguably (Black, 2008) linking itself to another key stakeholder, the 
donor community, to develop its own moral legitimacy. In Mitchell et al.,’s (1997) terms, by 
this action, civil society is attempting to increase its own salience in influencing CSR 
outcomes, by increasing its own legitimacy. 
 
d) Civil society co-opting MNC shareholders  
Whilst MNCs and the government as a coalition are argued to regard civil society as 
adversaries, civil society, on several occasions, has used other power-based strategies, 
including legal recourse. For example, in 2002 a particular CSO in Zambia took one of the 
mining MNCs to international arbitration over breaches of the development agreement 
regarding pollution. Whilst initially the government failed to cooperate with this particular 
NGO, in the end, it had to do so in finding an “amicable solution” because “that was what 
shareholders wanted also”. To quote C12: 
 
The shareholders want(s) us to find the amicable solution to this-would be transparent, to be 
open, will allow them to come and do audits to inspect(ion) us and give us recommendations on 
what must be done, government had no option but to fall in place, so it works out well [C12, p. 
15]. 
 
As a result of this activism, the NGO was able, as was the objective in the earlier example, to 
change the dynamics of its relationship with the government through a perhaps unexpected 
intervention by company shareholders, like donors perhaps describable as being dormant 
stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997). Whilst the Zambian government will usually negotiate 
and cooperate with MNCs senior management, in a state-business nexus, ultimately the 
western corporates are accountable to the shareholder community. In this particular example, 
civil society gained normative/morally-based legitimacy (Black, 2008) in its campaign 
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through the support of shareholders who perceived “the goals and/or procedures of the 
organisation (i.e. of this particular NGO) to be morally appropriate” (Siddiqui and Uddin, 
2016, p. 684). 
 
In both cases of NGO activism as being successful in co-opting either donors or MNC 
shareholders, these previously dormant stakeholders became more salient because they 
exercised ultimate power over financial resources critical to the Zambian state. Whilst both 
may be seen as dormant in terms of their influence most of the time, if suitably called upon to 
exert their influence as in the example above, then they demonstrate themselves to be major 
power wielders according to Zald’s (1970) definition. However, we see power as transitory 
so that there are limitations as to the extent to which civil society can rely on shareholder 
pressure to further its aims with regard to its CSR agenda. Given this view of power as 
transitory, whilst it can be acquired, it can be lost also. 
 
e)  But a constraint: the transitory nature of shareholder pressures favouring CSR  
Given these constraints, shareholder pressure favouring CSR can prove itself to be both 
narrow and limited to the financial interests of MNCs’ shareholders, as in the view of the 
interviewee from the supranational financial institution, W1 (p.8), “…if the corporate social 
responsibility activities are going to start affecting (the) bottom line, they will stop it”. 
 
Indeed, complicating factors as argued earlier, include the relatively rapid turnover in 
ownership of the corporates operating in Zambia plus the different national origins of the 
various firms with their diverse perspectives on CSR. 
 
However, more positively, some change is evident in the power of that other key stakeholder, 
the state, at least from the perspective of a number of government interviewees. 
 
The state as becoming more powerful versus in the past: 
 
f) Via legislative monitoring and other power-based strategies 
Despite continued secrecy on the part of the state-business nexus, the supranational financial 
institution stakeholder argues that the government is now more sophisticated despite civil 
society claims to the contrary [W1, p.5]. Similarly, government stakeholders argue that over 
the last few years, the state has regained power vis-a-vis the mining companies, especially 
through legislative monitoring and power-based strategies such as legal recourse and threats. 
These interviewees (e.g. G3) make comparisons with the government’s position at the time of 
negotiating the sale of the mining companies, which was forced upon the Zambian state, 
versus the current situation relative to the MNCs. Specifically, the state is now much better 
placed to renegotiate agreements with the MNCs, without being forced to amend the law in 
order to do so, such power being in part due to path dependency. 
 
g) Path dependency: government assuming the running of a particular mine 
Path dependency manifests itself as arising from the experience the state gained when it was 
forced to take over the running of a particular mine. Once the state had proved it could run 
the mine, this then added to its perceived legitimacy in future negotiations, so indicating the 
importance of credibility or reputation-building. This is particularly important in a situation 
where Zambia is so heavily dependent on the copper mining industry. To quote one of the 
company interviewees: 
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When Anglo-American walked out in 2002 from KCM mines, the government put in an interim 
team to run the operations. I think that gave some comfort to government that it can be done 
because (the) mines were run for one year with a team put into place and supervised by 
government directly. So when the recession came in 2006, they had a history. That is why they 
could stand up and negotiate very strongly to say, “You cannot just shut down”. There is a way 
in which things should be done [Μ1, p. 12, emphasis added]. 
 
Whilst legitimacy theory research is frequently concerned with the issue of corporate 
disclosures for reputation-building purposes (e.g. Tilling and Tilt, 2010), here, we are looking 
at something quite different. A non-corporate stakeholder, the state, manages to increase its 
legitimacy and power, in changing itself from the position of being a dependent stakeholder 
to a more salient one (Mitchell et al., 1997). This change, which is path dependent in the 
sense that in the quote above, it gives the state “a history”, enables it to some extent to change 
the rules of the game governing the relationship between the state and the MNCs, previously 
characterised by stark power asymmetry. 
 
However, the dynamics of path dependency can manifest themselves in other ways also with 
regard to the expectations of other key stakeholders. 
 
h) But path dependency again-community expectations 
Most respondents see the current level of CSR practices by the mining companies as 
significantly narrower in scope compared to that before privatisation under ZCCM. Not only 
has the scope of CSR provision narrowed, but in some cases also, mining companies engage 
in those activities where they have a vested interest, for example with respect to provision of 
medical care: 
 
Under ZCCM, these hospitals were even accessible to non-miners but the scope for non-miners 
to access the same hospitals now is dependent on their ability to pay the medical fees that are 
charged. [C7, p.1]. 
 
And later a corporate interviewee [M1, p. 13-14], explains:  
   
They [i.e. expectations] are not normal because I think our problem is we are moving from a 
situation of ZCCM. These are former mine townships where literally everything was provided 
for. […] The mine provided everything from schools to food. Sometimes even clothes, even 
coffin. So you and your family, you just wake up, go for work, the kids go to school and 
whatever…Now they are moving into a situation where suddenly you own a house, you must 
maintain it (emphasis added). 
 
Key to understanding the role of path dependency in community expectations of CSR is that 
under privatisation, an entirely new type of social contract between the mine operators, 
previously the state versus the MNCs, has come about. However, conditions under ZCCM 
ownership continue to colour current expectations of the community, discretionary 
stakeholders within Mitchell et al’s (1997) framework. Importantly, Mitchell et al., (1997), 
argue that in the absence of power or urgent claims by dependent stakeholders, there is no 
pressure on managers or in this case, MNCs, to engage in an active relationship with the 
latter, although corporates may choose to do so.  
 
D. Summary 
In our empirical analysis, particular dimensions of power asymmetry at the national level are 
evident in the relationship between the MNCs and the Zambian state which is so heavily 
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dependent on the corporates. Reinforcing this stark power asymmetry within the state-
business nexus is the exclusion of civil society, which views itself as having the potential to 
strengthen the power of the government in the interests of the wider community. Adopting a 
temporal analysis so as to capture changes in the dynamics of relationships between the key 
stakeholders, civil society is seen to be active in trying to change the old rules of the game. 
Some change is evident through civil society efforts to co-opt both donors and some MNC 
shareholders, with the aim of strengthening government power versus the MNCs. However, 
given what we have argued to be the transitory nature of power, such success may be short-
lived. Moreover, from a temporal analysis perspective, path dependency manifests itself in 
that community expectations regarding CSR continue to be shaped by prior experience under 
ZCCM, so leading to a widening divergence between such expectations and MNCs 
perspectives and impacting perceived CSR outcomes. 
 
6.  Discussion and conclusions 
In critically exploring the interactions of key stakeholders and their impact upon CSR 
practices in the Zambian copper mining sector, we find great discrepancies relative to the 
language of proportionate partnership in the agreements signed by the MNCs with the 
government. Such language of proportionate partnership masks stark power asymmetries 
between the state and the MNCs, which despite attempted interventions by civil society, are 
exacerbated by a number of issues discussed including divisions within government itself.  
 
From a perspective of both stakeholder salience theory (Mitchell et al., 1997; Neville et al., 
2011) and legitimation as derived from legitimacy theories, we find that some agency (albeit 
limited), is possible, particularly on the part of civil society but also of the state.  Indeed, 
whilst the state may often find itself in an adversarial position relative to civil society, both 
interventions by the latter discussed in Section 5 C above are undertaken by CSOs with the 
aim of empowering the state in its relationship with MNCs, with the end objective of 
changing the rules of the game. Importantly however, as regards meeting community 
expectations, due to path dependency in the form of the memories of the comprehensive 
provision by ZCCM under state ownership, this proves impossible under private ownership 
of the mines. Under privatisation, due both to the variety in national ownership of the 
companies plus their short-termist focus, as well as the absence of a state regulatory 
framework, CSR practices within Zambia lack coherence. However, now that the state is 
perceived as increasing its power to a limited extent, some change is viewed as possible by a 
number of stakeholders, consistent with our perspective of power as being transitory and of 
relationships as not being fixed. 
 
Exploration of these dynamics underlying the interaction of key stakeholders in Zambia 
reveals certain similarities, but also important differences from research to date. The major 
similarities to other relevant research in developing countries include an institutional context 
characterised by an absence of political will by government, capacity constraints on the part 
of the state, to which finding we add our own of capacity constraints on the part of civil 
society. Most importantly perhaps arising from such an institutional context, are stark power 
asymmetries existing between the state anxious to attract FDI and MNCs (e.g. Siddiqui and 
Uddin, 2016). The resultant alliance between the state and MNCs, is such that it is not only 
the general population which finds itself excluded, but also their representatives in the form 
of civil society organisations. Indeed in our study, civil society interviewees are largely 
united in seeing themselves as outsiders with respect to the relationship between MNCs and 
the state.  
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One contribution of our paper is that we add some subtlety to the concept of the state-
business nexus in finding that this alliance is perhaps not as straightforward as it first appears, 
with the MNCs dictating to the Zambian government, the terms on which they choose to 
operate. Instead, one civil society interviewee has the perspicacity to comment that the 
mining companies on occasion “are kind of forced into submission in silence” in that they 
fear that if they disclose too much information regarding how much they pay to the 
government in terms of taxes etc., they may embarrass the state to which they feel 
accountable, given that the latter is the licensing authority. Indeed, there may exist perhaps a 
type of conspiracy of silence between the state and the mining companies in that to 
paraphrase a popular expression, each is aware of the skeletons in the other’s closet. Viewed 
from these perspectives, the state-business relationship in Zambia may be more complex than 
that of the master-slave analogy used by one civil society interviewee in describing the 
relationship between the local community and MNCs. Instead, whilst undoubtedly there is 
substantial power asymmetry, there is also some (probably limited) mutuality implied in that 
the identity of the so-called power wielders or dominant stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997) 
becomes more nuanced and subject to change, than is implied in much of the literature on 
CSR in developing countries. 
 
Importantly, with respect to Gray et al.,’s (1995) concept of power wielders, usually assumed 
in the literature to be the mining companies, we do not always hear consistent messages from 
this stakeholder group. Indeed, our analysis suggests that there are many competing voices 
within the same stakeholder group, so adding another dimension of complexity to the 
interaction between key stakeholder groups and their effect upon CSR practices. Specifically, 
we find CSR to be an alien concept to the Chinese SOEs while the country in which the 
organisation is reporting and the country of ultimate ownership appears to have a significant 
effect on CSR. From this perspective, the SOEs’ stance is perhaps understandable, these 
firms being largely shielded from the international legitimation pressures facing the western 
publicly quoted MNCs. If correct, this helps support our argument as to the importance of 
legitimation pressures on companies, notwithstanding that the relevant legitimation pressures 
emanate perhaps primarily from the parent company based overseas, not from the local 
communities affected by the firms’ operations. 
 
Indeed, this phenomenon of parent companies’ increasing interest in questions of 
sustainability and business ethics as evident in Section 5 C above where civil society was 
able to co-opt MNC shareholders support, highlights a potential weakness of our analysis. 
This relates to the fact that in accordance with a political economy perspective, we have 
focused our attention largely on the Zambian context. A fuller analysis of global factors 
interacting with outcomes in Zambian copper mining would have highlighted further relevant 
phenomena in more detail including increased international concern with such matters of 
business ethics. Further relevant issues could include perhaps factors influencing the 
activities of mining companies based in different countries such as China, a relatively new 
entrant to Zambia, and consideration specifically of their impact on stakeholder dynamics. 
 
Implications of incorporating a temporal perspective into our analysis include that rather than 
focusing simply on a situation of unchanging stark power asymmetries, we search for and 
indeed, find something different. What we see in its place is an institutional context in the 
form of a subtly changing picture like a kaleidoscope, in which the identity of power wielders 
changes, leading to something of a state of flux. Our focus on activities at the micro level by 
individual stakeholders primarily using various legitimation techniques, shifts perhaps only 
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slightly, the overall balance of power as path dependency means that previous successes 
change perceptions and so accepted practice.  
 
However, we accept that such changes appear to have been relatively minor, as dictated by 
the overall context in which the sector is of such importance to the Zambian economy. 
Indeed, our analysis supports Sinkovics et al’s (2016) conclusions as to the nature of the 
garment industry in Bangladesh. This is that the copper mining sector in Zambia holds a 
paradoxical role in this country as it is both a heavy contributor to the country’s economic 
development but also that it acts as a potential obstacle to its future development (Belal et al., 
2015). In the case of Zambia, this is perhaps even truer than the Bangladeshi example, given 
that copper is both a wasting asset[14] and the cause of substantial environmental 
degradation.  
 
Importantly, whilst we have employed a political economy framework in our overall analysis 
of the dynamics of key stakeholder interactions in Zambia and of their effects upon CSR 
practices, we acknowledge this to constitute only a start, limited by the sheer scale of 
undertaking such a study. Specifically, while we have borrowed concepts from legitimacy 
theory but also from stakeholder salience theory (Mitchell et al., 1997) in order to analyse 
practice at the micro level, there has been subsequent development of the latter framework in 
particular (e.g. Neville et al., 2011), which could be employed profitably in the analysis at the 
micro level of more detailed cases of power asymmetry in both Zambia and in other contexts 
characterised by stark power asymmetries. 
 
Consequently, following Belal and Owen (2015, p. 1187), we acknowledge that our 
theoretical ambition may be limited, given our desired significant empirical contribution 
which extends significantly the work carried out to date on the Zambian copper mining 
industry. Further limitations include that although we have interviewed two trade union 
officials as well as a representative from the House of Chiefs representing local communities, 
we have not included the perspectives of actual non-managerial employees, specifically 
miners who are key stakeholders not represented in the current study.  
 
As miners are key stakeholders perhaps most affected by MNC operations, further research 
could profitably employ approaches such as “oral history” (Hammond and Sikka, 1996), so 
as to give voice to those who have been largely silent to date. At the other end, further 
research could specifically address the view of the so-called owners of the mining companies, 
likely to be major institutional shareholders in the case of the western MNCs. For the other 
mining companies in this study, this approach would have to be adapted appropriately 
according to nationality and their relevant ownership structures. Whilst the financialisation 
literature (e.g. Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000) often suggests that the corporate pursuit of 
shareholder value may have adverse consequences for less powerful stakeholders, the earlier 
example cited of shareholder pressure in favour of CSR indicates that this may not always be 
the case.  
 
The current research has focused largely on the current dynamics of pressures within Zambia 
either in favour or militating against CSR. However, future work could draw on the post-
colonial literature in particular to explore how Zambia’s colonial past, neoliberal reforms and 
integration to the global market still shape the social and structural conditions so determining 
the future of CSR and development in the country. 
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Notes 
1. However, there are suggestions that the contribution to GDP could be as high as 14% despite the low 
reported official figures (ICMM, 2014). 
2. A distinction between legitimacy and legitimation (Lindblom, 1994) is key in our application of legitimacy 
theory. Legitimacy is “a condition or status which exists when an entity’s value system is congruent with the 
value system of the larger social system of which the entity is a part” (Lindblom, 1994, p. 2) while 
“legitimation is the process whereby an organization justifies to a peer or superordinate system its right to 
exist” (Maurer, 1971, p. 361). 
3. “Political economy is the study of the interplay of power, the goals of power wielders and the productive 
exchange system (Zald, 1970, p. 233). As a framework, political economy does not concentrate exclusively 
on market exchanges. Rather it first of all analyses exchanges in whatever institutional framework  they 
occur and, second, analyses the relationships between social institutions such as government, law and 
property rights, each fortified by power and the economy, i.e. the system of producing and exchanging goods 
and services” (Gray et al., 1995, p. 74). 
4. According to Mitchell et al., (1997, p. 865-866) “…a party to a relationship has power, to the extent it has or 
can gain access to coercive, utilitarian, or normative means, to impose its will in the relationship. […] this 
access […] is a variable, not a steady state, which is one reason why power is transitory: it can be acquired 
as well as lost.” 
5. The Interview Protocol is available on request from the authors. 
6. Formal introduction was first made to one government ministry through one academic institution. The 
government ministry then gave authorisation to conduct interviews with government officials and further, an 
introductory letter to mining companies was given which greatly enabled access. Access to civil society 
representatives was relatively easy as first contact was made before the field work, and then snowballing 
techniques worked effectively. 
7. The vulnerability of the economy to volatile copper prices can also be observed during the 2007 global 
financial crisis when some mining companies had to close (such as Luanshya Copper Mines) and others put 
under care and maintenance (such as Chambishi Metals). It was reported that close to 13,000 of the 30,000 
mining and mining related jobs were lost (Lungu and Kapena, 2010). 
8. Of this amount, over USD600 million can be directly attributed to Chinese investment (ZDA, 2013). 
9. Currently, the Ministry of Mines and Minerals Development (MMMD) centralises responsibilities over the 
mining sector and enacts the mining policy which was developed to enable privatisation (MMMD, 2010). 
The ministry’s Mines Safety Department is responsible for formulation and monitoring of health and safety 
in the mining companies. 
10. In 2015, the regulatory quality ranking of Zambia was at 37% compared, for example, to Tanzania at 41% 
(WGI, 2017). 
11. Compared to other resource rich countries, Zambia is relatively stable politically and is seen as “good” at 
democracy, ranking high on the Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) at 51% in political stability and 
with an absence of reported violence (compared, for example to 30% for Tanzania) in 2015 (WGI, 2017). 
However, there are usually reported cases of violence or riots especially around the election periods as was 
the case in the recent 2016 elections (Aljazeera, 2016). 
12. In the interests of balance, we acknowledge that there are social projects funded by the mining companies 
that promote CSR, such as the Sustainable Rural Livelihood Development Project that promotes alternative 
livelihood and women farmers’ empowerment (KCM, 2017), and the Agri-Food Innovators (AFI) program 
aimed at assisting local farmers to learn different irrigation technologies and sustainable farming methods 
(Barrick, 2013). 
13. The interviewee was referring to government regulatory agencies that are supposed to operate more 
independently such as the Zambia Environmental Management Agency (ZEMA). 
14. A wasting asset is a natural resource (such as copper, coal, gas, oil, ores) that gets depleted, without 
replacement, from continued extraction. As the resource is being extracted, a day must come when it will be 
exhausted. 
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[Appendix 1: Detailed list of interviewees, about here] 
 
 
[Appendix 2: Major Mining Company operations in Zambia, about here] 
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Figure 1: Zambian Copper Production 1963 – 2014 
 
Source: International Council on Mining and Metals, 2014; Zambia Chamber of Mines, 2014 
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EPPCA     - Environmental Protection and Pollution Control Act of 1990 
EPPCR         - Environmental Protection and Pollution Control (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 
of 1997 
EIAR     - Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations 
MMER     - Mines and Minerals Environmental Regulations of 1997 
MM(EPF)R  - Mines and Minerals (Environmental Protection Fund) Regulations of 1998 
MMDA     - Mines and Minerals Development Act of 1995 (amended in 2008) 
MMMD    - Ministry of Mines and Mineral Development  
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Labour, Ministry of 
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Table 1: Mining contribution to Zambian economy (2012) 
Source: ICMM, 2014; OPM, 2013 
 
 
 Zambia Typical share in other mineral 
dependent countries 
Foreign exchange earnings 80% 30%- 60% 
Gross domestic product >12% 3%- 10% 
Foreign direct investment 86% 60%- 90% 
Government revenue >25% 3%- 20% 
Direct employment 1.7% 1% 
Formal sector employment 8.3%  
Private sector formal employment 25%  
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX 2: MAJOR MINING COMPANY OPERATIONS IN ZAMBIA 
 
Name of Mine Output 
percent* 






35.07% First Quantum Minerals Ltd (80%); 
ZCCM Investment Holding Plc 
(20%) 
Canada Copper, gold 
Lumwana 
Mining Plc 




20.73% Vedanta Resources Plc (79%); 








14.75% Glencore Xstrata Plc (73%); First 
Quantum Minerals Ltd (17%); 







3.29% China Nonferrous Mining Corp Ltd 
(85%); ZCCM Investments 
Holdings Plc (15%) 
China Copper, cobalt 
Chibuluma 
Mines Plc 
2.66% Jinchuan (85%); ZCCM 
Investments Holdings Plc (15%) 




1.58% China Nonferrous Mining Corp Ltd 
(80%); ZCCM Investments 
Holdings Plc (20%) 
China Copper, cobalt 
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Referee Comments and Reply 
 Comment Reply 
1 
 
The authors have refocused and clearly improved the paper. The 
refocus on power assymetries and the inclusion of legitimacy and 
legitimation does work. The paper is better theorized and there is 
good context. Thus referee comments have been addressed in a 
good way. The paper represents a contribution to literature which 
this referee is happy to accept. 
 













A few small points/details which can improve the paper further 
The paper is a little bit long(er than AAAJ recommendation).  This 
referee does not have a big  problem with this especially as much 
of this extra length comes from the authors addressing referee 
comments in a comprehensive way.  
 
However I recommend you exclude the Interview Protocol 
(instead you can state that it is available from authors upon 
request).    
 
Perhaps the authors can see if the empirics can be a little bit 
polished/streamlined so that the word count reduces a little bit 
without omitting too much content. 
 
 
Sections 4 and 5 have been 
streamlined in order to reduce 
the paper.  
 
 
Interview protocol removed and 
footnote (5) inserted 
 
 
The section has been 
streamlined. 
 
3 Figure 2 I helpful, but perhaps a very brief explanation (even in a 
footnote or figure text) of what 
“EPPCA, EIAR, MMDA, MMER” are could be helpful.  
 
Acronyms put in the text of the 
figure 
4 Figure 3 whilst interesting is not always so clear.  Especially the 
Civil society box contains many 
acronyms which will mean nothing to non Zambian readers  (TIZ, 
CPD, PWYP…)  Perhaps some short 
figure text or footnote can explain some of this. 
 
Acronyms put in the text of the 
figure 
5 Are local communities excluded from ZEITI?  Based on the Figure 3 
it would seem so (no arrows). 
 
 
Added missing arrow from local 
communities  
6 I would either add GPFG  (= Government Pension Fund Global) 
after Norwegian in the External  
pressure or factors box (Fig 3), or possibly delete (e.g. Norwegian). 
Despite its name this fund is 
classified as a Sovereign Wealth Fund.  Given the size of this fund 
and that it has publicly excluded 
many mining firms including some in the study it may be 
warranted to keep it.  
 
Deleted Norwegian and added 
GPFG. However, “Norwegian” 
was the term used for 
Government Pension Fund of 
Norway (GPFN) which comprises 
both the GPFG and GPFN 
7 Given space there is a question of whether both the short and 
detailed interviewee list should be included (although the referee 
found the long list informative).  
 
Table 1 deleted 
8 P.9 you mention SOE but only define it on p.13 (move definition or 
add short footnote) 
 
Definition moved to page 9. 
9 P.10 about mid page (line 43) CSR Strategies(Van Alstine and 
Afionis, 2013)     (space missing) 
 
Space added 
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10 P.12 top under a) heading:   Star ting  (a space there should not be) 
 
Corrected 
11 p.13 define CSO  (short in a footnote) or move in your definition 
from p16. 
 
CSO definition moved to p13 




13 P.21. about line 52 ,  remove “perhaps” 
 
‘Perhaps’ removed 
14 P.23.  What is meant by the statement (line 25) that “copper is 
both a wasting asset…”  Do  you mean  
“the copper asset” is declining? 
 
Explanation added as footnote 
14. 
15 Further research  
Consider “ At the other end”   rather than “At the other extreme” 
(interviewing workers or shareholders is not “extreme”). 
 
Changed 
16 Many good new quotes are added and Limitations are 
acknowledged, this is positive. The 
comparisons with Tanzania are helpful (fn 11 and 12).  
 
Comment from referee 
appreciated 
17 The referee would like to point out that in the “Divisions within 
stakeholder groups”, both within government and mining 
companies there could be material for another paper, how these 
dynamics work. Here both theories of power and political 
economy can be used…   
 
Point noted for further research.  
18 it is interesting to note these conflicts. The referee knows of 
conflicts within government and conflicts within the 
owner/shareholder group also from other contexts.  
 
Will ask referee for such context 
in developing next paper! 
19 In References  Sikka (2010) was published in Accounting Forum    
(not Accountability Forum) 
 
Corrected 
19 Fox (2004) lacks No/Issue 
 
No. inserted 
20 Another concern (not with the paper but for Zambia) is that the 
only mine 100% controlled by an MNC (Lumwana Mining) is 
controlled by Barrick Gold. Barrick Gold is excluded from the 
Norwegian GPFG for serious environmental violations.   Vedanta 
Resources is also excluded for env. Violations, these two firms 
seem to control over 42% of the output in Zambia.   Also Appendix 
3 clearly shows  (as you discuss in the paper) that the entire sector 
is controlled by foreign MNCs or Chinese SOEs.  
 
Thank you for an interesting study, I look forward to seeing it 
published. 
 
Valid observation from referee. 
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